How the Trump Campaign Used an Obscure Political Science Concept to Move the Electorate
By: Ryan J. McComb
In the aftermath of the election, a wave of analysis has swept through the Democratic Party and political pundits alike. The reasoning spans from Democratic rancour over Biden's resignation to the lack of time and preparation that the Harris campaign had at its disposal. However, unlike its predecessors, this election was shaped by a concept older than the United States itself.
The term Median Voter Theory was coined by Duncan Black in the mid-1900s and refers to the idea that in a first-past-the-post, plurality voting system, a "Median Voter" would decide the election. However hypothetical, this voter would represent the collective opinion of the country's policy positions. Due in part to the obscurity of the concept, it is commonly misconceived that the "voter" would split policy positions evenly down the middle. For much of U.S. policy, they would, or come close. However, on issues like abortion or immigration, their "median" view might lean left or right of centre, respectively. This dynamic often forces major party candidates to adopt policy and rhetoric that is often far different or antithetical to primary policy in order to appeal to a wider range of voters in a national election.
The Strategic Exploitation
In this election, the Trump campaign identified a unique opportunity to tactically exploit Median Voter Theory in action: leveraging Kamala Harris' 2020 bid for president to position her as out of touch with the "median voter." The first few weeks of the "switch" were a tumultuous time for both campaigns. On one side, the Trump team scrambled to create media and strategy for the new opponent. On the other side, the Democratic campaign underwent upheaval, creating entirely new media and advertisements solely for publicity. While both efforts generated effective publicity for their respective campaigns, albeit a bit differently, Harris' pre-existing favourability challenges suggest deeper issues.
Examining her public perception before the ticket change reveals a critical vulnerability that shaped the election's trajectory.
Almost immediately after inauguration, her favourability began to slip into the negatives, slowly rising and plateauing at a remarkable 17.4 points underwater. Unlike Trump1, who maintained a -10 point favourability for a while coming into the election2, Harris had nearly three years for her discontent to marinate throughout the American people. This was not fully unexpected; Vice Presidents take much more blame and much less credit proportionally than their dynamic counterparts3. Her declining favourability reflected both short-term events and long-term perceptions. While discontent with the administration, particularly following the Afghanistan withdrawal, played a role, a more enduring factor was the public's lingering impression of her lackluster showing and progressive policies during the 2020 primaries4.
In 2020, she was an extremely different candidate than the one she tried to be in 2024. All credit given, you need different pieces of policy that will win you a primary. However, on the stage, she was far left. With this being her first exposure to the broader American public, she did see a temporary bump due to the partisan nature of her messaging in the primaries and the impending election, where few Democratic voters would say that she was an unfavourable choice. Even so, her policies soured among much of her Democratic contingent as well.
Running with the Data
Armed with the same data that is at the press of a few buttons on your laptop, the Trump campaign took it and ran. They pushed out tens of millions of dollars' worth of advertisements just playing and capitalising upon clips of town halls and debates during her primary process. One of the key harangues was "Kamala is for They/Them," capitalising upon comments made during her run in the primaries and early in her tenure.
This wasn't accidental. Reinforcing the messages, especially anti-trans sentiments that have become a slight advantage for the Republicans, that were said to win a primary had a very different effect on an already polarised electorate. Remember, the median voter types tend to match the quintessentially fought-over "swing voters." Reinforcing an already advantageous message to a group of people with quasi-malleable opinions was a great strategy. While Median Voter Theory does lack a spatial awareness5 of the issues presented, basically how much the issues matter, and to whom, it does model voting in a relatively realistic fashion. Even though it was subliminal, Trump mentioned her tax policy, something of paramount importance to voters, while focusing upon her extreme stances on trans-sports and trans-rights.
The Culmination
A culmination of the advertisement as aforementioned, along with countless others, propelled a win among the "swingiest" groups, notably Latinos. Using the already marinated national image and clips from her primary run, Trump and his contingent pushed Harris just far enough from the median in many of her policies to get the votes from the crucial swing voters. This was only made easier by many of the preconceived notions that Harris had left voters with during her first national run.
To visualise this, let's suppose that tax policy opinions tend to lean liberal among the public. We can demonstrate what a few advertisements and some old policy choices, made to win a primary, would do to a voter's opinion of the candidates on the issue.
Albeit a crude image, you can see that with a bit of reestablishment of some unfavourable policy choices, Trump is able to win that specific category among the "median voter." Inherently, you have to win many categories, but some stand out. Trump mainly attacked Harris on her far-left policy in regards to the border and some of her proposals for where to spend tax dollars that is germane to the economy in voting6. Seeing as these categories play outsized roles in the electorate7, a blanket of ads over every issue was not necessary.
Looking Back
With all of that said, it has to be remembered that no one candidate loses due to one, two, or even three factors. In Harris' case, her semi-extreme policy positions from the 2020 election seem to have stuck with the voter. Additionally, all politicians go through some type of primary process and stray to the partisans, to whom they are rightfully appealing. However, candidates that are threatened by previous words tend to be running for president8, inherently giving a chance to change policy directly after the primaries. Nevertheless, Harris' case presents a uniqueness unseen before; her policy from her first national appearances was just ripe enough for remembrance while also being far enough from the present for attack advertisements from the Trump Team to fill in the blanks on her "policy goals."
Could this have been avoided? Maybe. Even a primary process would have likely crowned her as heir apparent; however, she would have been given years, not weeks, to establish herself on the national stage and push back and reestablish her brand state-by-state. How would she have acquired more time? Just as so many post-mortems have said, Biden should have ceded; it all comes back to the big man in the end.
1 Even with his mercurial nature, he managed to keep his approval relatively the same throughout the election cycle.
2 He now sits at close to 0, with an official rating of -0.3. This is well within the margin of error, so it's basically a wash.
3 PBS - The Evolving Vice Presidency
4 Vox - Kamala Harris Polls, 2020 Election
6 Pew Research - Economic and Policy Changes
7 Pew Research - Issues and the 2024 Election
8 Given that the others don't need to worry because they tend to be on the sidelines, or behind presidential policy, not running for office.
More from Ryan McComb
For more on elections, forecasting, VoteHub, and my broader work, start with these pages.